Russian Forces in Kaliningrad: Implications of the newly formed 18th Guards Motor Rifle Division

BLUF

Several tactical formations in Kaliningrad have been reorganized into a restored 18^th Guards Motor Rifle division. The plan to establish this division was telegraphed at least two years in advance. After much neglect, Kaliningrad began seeing modernization, infrastructure investment, and a slow force structure expansion after 2016. Russian ground forces have been converting many of their brigades back into divisions as the main tactical formation, though quite a few appear to have 3 instead of 4 maneuver regiments in practice. The news has been covered elsewhere in BMPD and Konrad Muzyka took a stab at it earlier, so I’m not the first to write on this, but hope this will be a more comprehensive update.

The map below from Konrad’s report for CNA, published in 2020, is useful for this discussion. I think Konrad did a good job in that report and it features great maps.

From Konrad’s 2020 report for CNA on the disposition of Russian forces in the Western Military District.

Implications for force structure in Kaliningrad

What does this mean? The 11^th Army Corps will likely go from fielding 6 motor rifle battalions to 10, and from the currently deployed ~2 tank battalions, with 4 planned post-2019, to 6 tank battalions in total. I will try to offer some brief background on these plans, and recent history of force modernization in Kaliningrad. The short of it is that while this is a notable expansion of the force structure in Kaliningrad, it was long in coming, and folks should not be shocked by the outcome. Best to discuss it now, before the newly recreated 18^th division makes its debut in exercises during Zapad-2021.

On December 1, 2020 the commander of Russia’s Baltic Fleet, Aleksandr Nosatov, announced that the division would be formed within the 11^th Army Corps. There were rumors that a division level formation was returning to Kaliningrad, and it became almost self-evident that this was the plan once the Russian MoD began establishing a separate tank regiment earlier in 2019. On March 2^nd, 2021 Kartapalov formally presented the division’s new banner, so they moved fairly quickly towards getting this off the ground. The division legacy harkens back to its creation in 1939, seeing action in WWII and receiving the Guards honorific in 1942. The 18th besieged Konigsberg in 1945.

Divisional banner presentation March 2021

After several reformations, it eventually ended up as the 79^th Motor Rifle Brigade, which is the unit they used to remake the division again. There and back again is the story of Russian force structure. The brigade’s kit will form two motor rifle regiments, and they will use the command/support elements to form the core of the division. The 7^th separate motor rifle regiment does not look like it will be part of this division, and remain more of a coastal defense force backing the 336^th Naval Infantry Brigade. This discussion will not include the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade, 561^st Naval reconnaissance center, 69^th Naval Engineering Regiment, or the EW center there, i.e. the focus of this post is on the ground force reorganization within the Army Corps.

Implications for force structure? Ten motor rifle battalions instead of six will net around 2,000 more personnel, with a BMP-2/BTR-82A/MT-LB mix that averages out to 500 per battalion. The 11^th separate tank regiment, plus three tank battalions (6 total), gives us almost 190 tanks, and ~40 BMPs supporting that regiment. Also, more self-propelled artillery battalions, as they already received the better part of a battalion of MSTA-S. By the looks of it the division will not include the 244^th artillery brigade or the 22^nd air defense regiment. They’re currently listed as part of 11^th Army Corps, not the division. The 11th AC will need to assemble a mix of 2S19, 2S3s, and towed artillery in the interim to setup those arty battalions. Right now they have a battalion’s worth of 2S3 Akatsiya (18), most of a 2S19 MSTA-S battalion in the tank regiment, and several BM-21 Grad companies. It is possible one of the PVO-SV air defense regiments will join the division.

The 79^th brigade appears to be split into 79^th motor rifle regiment, with basically one seeder battalion right now, and another regiment is already being listed as the 9^th motor rifle regiment with what looks closer to two battalions. The 11^th tank regiment is being stood up with about two battalions filled. A batch of 30 T-72B3s had already arrived to get this unit started. The 7^th independent motor rifle regiment appears like its going to remain independent, and even though I see it frequently listed as having a tank battalion – I do not believe this to be the case. This unit is primarily armed with BMP-2s, mortars, and Grad MLRS. Update: in April they renamed these motor rifle regiments the 275th and 280th, receiving the legacy of the regiments which originally belonged to the 18th division.

Why the change? Different reasons have been floated in the press, but the most logical is that brigades are for mobility, whereas divisions are larger static formations to hold down a front. Some articles describing this decision lay out the argument that existing forces were not sufficient to defend Kaliningrad against an attack from several vectors, i.e. Poland, Lithuania, and the coast. Also, that it is in response to increased U.S. force posture in Baltics. That could be true, and this could be your typical security dilemma outcome, or they were going to turn these units into a division anyway when the money/personnel side of the equation made sense. If we assume the 11^th Army Corps is around 8,500 personnel right now with the division partially filled at about 50%, that total number could go north towards toward 10,500-11,000, not including coastal defense, or naval infantry units. I expect this to be a 3 maneuver regiment division, unless the 7th is brought in later. This is probably a conservative estimate depending on what happens with division support regiments as they still have to bring in a bunch more artillery and air defense.

Here is a hypothetical diagram from a Russian military article showing operational level divisions, and a prospective counter attack against a blue force that is invading Kaliningrad/Belarus. The discussion is from an article examining the use of army aviation in providing fires. You can see on this map the blue attack points into Kaliningrad from north and south, and those heading into Belarus. I would not run off with this as a scenario roadmap, but it is useful to illustrate some of the considerations.

В.В. АРИСТОВ, В.И. КОВАЛЕВ, В.В. БЕЛОНОЖКИН, С.В. МИТРОФАНОВА, МЕТОДИКА ОЦЕНКИ ЭФФЕКТИВНОСТИ ВЫПОЛНЕНИЯ ОГНЕВЫХ ЗАДАЧ ПОДРАЗДЕЛЕНИЯМИ АРМЕЙСКОЙ АВИАЦИИ В ТЕМНОЕ ВРЕМЯ СУТОК С УЧЕТОМ МЕТЕОРОЛОГИЧЕСКИХ УСЛОВИЙ

A bit of background

Soviet forces based in Kaliningrad were a large combat grouping centered around the 11th Guards Army. This formation was disbanded in the 1990s during a period demobilization and consolidation. Kaliningrad is mythologized as a fortress or bastion, but the forces there have historically suffered from lower readiness, and it has proven to be one of the last groupings to receive modernized equipment. Consider that 11^th Army had over 800 tanks deployed in Kaliningrad, whereas after then force was considerably downloaded in the 1990s, and the ‘New Look’ reforms, the 11^th Army Corps had on hand a single independent tank battalion with 41 tanks in it. They were dated T-72B1s with some BAs mixed in.

The Baltic Fleet is the runt of the four main fleets in the Russian navy. It has historically suffered from low readiness, poor attention to infrastructure investment, and dated kit. As an anecdote, I submit this 2013 story of a drunk soldier who took a BMP-2 to buy cigarettes, ran off the road, got it stuck in a ditch, then while he was getting a second BMP to tow it out the first one caught fire because he did not turn off the power block. Things have turned around since 2016, but this formation has only recently begun to benefit from the wave of modernization across the Russian armed forces.

In June 2016 there was a mass firing of 50 high ranking officers, including squadron, and brigade commanders. The purge was quite public. The fleet’s condition had declined, state of housing was poor, and the forces demonstrated poor readiness in exercises. Kaliningrad was more an outpost, and less a dreadfort. The commander at the time, Kravchuk, was tasked with creating a joint military grouping capable of defending this operational sector as part of the overall Western strategic direction. The money was seemingly embezzled or misspent. Either way, things did not begin to turn around until after 2016.

Since then, Russian forces in Kaliningrad began receiving new kit:

• Two air defense regiments in the 44^th Air defense division received S-400 battalion kits, although it looks like there might still be a couple S-300PS battalions left there as far as I know. This update has been long in progress, since 2013 if I recall.
• Aerospace Forces (VKS) received some newer Su-30SM, Su-27P, and upgraded Su-24MPs as part of the 34^th Composite Aviation Division.
• The 22^nd air defense regiment got fully upgraded with Tor-M2s, along with the other regiments under the 44^th air defense division. 
• In 2018 the 152^nd Missile Brigade began the transition from Tochka-U to Iskander-M, which now appears complete.
• In early 2019 the 11^th separate tank regiment was announced. This first looked like it was being created out of the existing independent tank battalion in the 79^th, but then became clear it was in addition to, with 30 T-72B3s arriving to start the first battalion.
• In 2020 the 224^th Artillery BDE received BM-27 Uragan in place of the BM-21 Grad. Some news reports suggested it was BM-30 Smerch, but I’m skeptical. That’s a fairly high-end/low availability capability in the Russian ground forces. They also took delivery of Crysanthemum-S ATGM tank destroyers for an anti-tank battalion. 
• The coastal defense forces’ 25^th independent coastal defense missile brigade currently fields 1-2 battalions of Bastion-P (SSC-5), and one battalion of BAL (SSC-6), soon to receive another battalion of Bastion-P. This is a bit murky, I can’t quite tell if they have three battalions increasing to four, or two turning into three. Since INF’s demise, different Russian news sources have been reporting various new ranges for Bastion-P, including 600km now. This is unsurprising, as the range of the missile always appeared to be understated, especially depending on flight profile. So you can pick your range for some of these systems, and Iskander-M is being advertised as having anti-ship functionality, just as all the anti-ship missiles can perform ground strike.

The 11th Army Corps independent tank battalion drilling during Zapad-2017.

Conclusion

Back in 2014 Kaliningrad was a creaky military outpost awaiting improvements even though some popularized wargames showed it contributing a host of battalion tactical groups to an invasion of the Baltics. Reorganizing around a division will give the enclave a much stronger ground force, but its more significant implication is the addition of more artillery and MLRS systems, which will allow the units based there to ‘interdict’ with fires and strike systems ground lines of communication without leaving Russian territory. The air defense and anti-ship component has seen significant upgrades, along with sensors, like over the horizon radar, and greater functionality for strike systems (ability to strike targets on land or at sea). It’s going to get a bit dense in Kaliningrad with all those units, and in the event of a military contingency it will be pretty hard to ignore or leave a formation this large along one’s flank, especially now that there is a tank regiment that can conduct maneuver without having to support motor rifle regiments (which have their own dedicated tank battalions.)

Invariably when considering force expansion plans people ask two questions: can they afford it, and do they have the people? The defense budget is quite large, with substantial purchasing power, and not expected to meaningfully decline. Russia’s problem is defense industrial capacity, less the money allocated to procurement/modernization. So yes, they can afford the kit. There is also no shortage of people demographics-wise, even though erroneous reports crop up frequently suggesting there will be fewer young Russians available for conscription. If anything, availability should increase until 2033, but there is a limit on overall resources, which results in choices between capability, capacity, and readiness. Therefore, the active force is not growing in total size even as larger formations get announced. That is a choice on prioritization. Contract servicemen cost money. Consequently, we are seeing a significant decrement to overall readiness as the price of a larger force structure with better capability. Formations expand, but they’re not effectively manned. So, this shift to divisions ultimately yields a partial mobilization structure, and it will prove to be the case in Kaliningrad as well.

P.S. FOI has a new report out on the Baltic Fleet by Jonas Kjellén that folks should check out.

New Russian Divisions and other units shifting to Ukraine’s borders – second look with updates

Bill Gertz’s article alleging that there were “40,000” troops massing on Ukraine’s borders inspired me to take another look at where the three planned divisions, and other unit movements stand right now.  There is quite a bit of activity and leadership announcements as part of the Russian shift to what Shoigu calls the “southwestern strategic direction.”  Essentially, a containment ring is being built circumscribing Ukraine, including large unit formations in permanent garrisons to serve as a quick reaction force in the event of a conventional war.

Some plans dating back to 2014 have already been realized, most are in progress, and several announcements are only now getting under way with completion timelines set for late 2017.  I’m underlining dates because certain people misread the May post in this blog, and I suspect other blogs on this topic, and then said that all these announced units were already in position – they are not.

At the moment Russia does not have 40,000 troops massing on Ukraine’s borders, but principally Russia’s General Staff seems to have Ukraine in mind.  The changes in force posture are designed to deal with medium-long term scenarios rather than the current conflict.  This is a large force that can effect conventional deterrence by denial, and if need be compellence, in a future crisis with Ukraine.

The reason for moving the 20th Army HQ back, resurrecting the 1st Tank Army, and creating a host of new units on Ukraine’s borders is fairly straightforward.  During the chaotic reforms 2009-2011 numerous units were consolidated or cut from the Western MD.  Others were moved further south or east.  In 2014 Russia had to improvise a combined staff of 20th and 58th Armies to put together two task forces on Ukraine’s borders.  That may have worked in February-April 2014, but its far from optimal, and simply will not do in a contingency where Russian forces need to intervene again.  Ukraine’s military is far larger in size and more capable relative to the hollowed out paper force that existed in spring of 2014.

Russian staff likely fears a ‘Croatia scenario’ whereby  Ukraine cordons off the separatist republics and then builds up an army large enough to wipe them out in a few years.  With three divisions, plus several brigades, organized under two combined arms armies (CAA) headquartered nearby, they figure it will deter future Ukrainian leaders from such adventurism.  It also places Ukraine in a geographic vice, running from Yelnya to Crimea.  It is not feasible that Ukraine will build an army capable of attacking Donbass and holding Russian units on so many fronts.  The units required to attempt an ATO 2.0 (now with a real army) would leave no defenders for other vectors of Russian attack.  Each division will be a self-sustaining strike force, ensuring that Kiev does not feel confident in the ability to retake the separatist regions through force.

A breakdown of the plans:

1.)  10th Armored Division (presumed) in Bogychar (Voronezh oblast) – When 20th Combined Arms Army moved from Mulino in Nizhegorod Oblast to Voronezh, so did 9th Motor Rifle Brigade from Dzerzhinsk to Bogychar.  This began in February 2015.  I wrote in May of this year that 1st Independent Armored Brigade will likely assume the legacy of 10th Armored Division, a move announced in July 2015.

10th Armor served in Easter Germany during the Cold War and returned in 1991.  In 2009 this division was turned into the 262nd Military Storage and Repair Base during the Serduykov period of consolidation and knocking down units in Western MD.  That base has a large stockpile and it looks like the 1st Armored Brigade will be needing it to become the 10th Armored Division.  All the divisions are likely to have a classic Soviet six regiment structure.  This unit will take into 2017  to form. So, this is a case of there and back again for the Russian army. Between 2009-2016 the process flow has been: 10th Div -> 262nd Base -> 1st Bde -> 10th Div.

Here  is a nice photo of the 262nd base in Bogychar.  It’s going to get busy with 9th Bde and a new division there.

2.) 144th Motor Rifle Division in Yelnya (Smolensk oblast) – The plans for this unit were essentially announced back in 23 November 2014, and in September 2015 it was confirmed that a newly formed independent motor rifle brigade will return to Yelnya.  The 144th motor rifle division was once based here after being withdrawn from Estonia, disbanded in 1998, and converted into a military warehouse base.  A new unit will assume the legacy of the 144th and become the core of the announced division.

Early July of 2015 the MoD announced that this motor rifle division will be formed by second half of 2017 and be assigned to the 1st Tank Guards Army.  Second half of 2017 is optimistic since according to one paper the total military personnel expected by summer of 2017 is 6,000, of which 3,600 will be contract and officers.  It goes without saying that 6,000 is less than the 10,000 promised.  Not quite enough to fill six regiments of 3 motor rifle , 1 armor, 1 artillery, 1 air defense and the rest support units.  The expectation for 2016  is two battalions will arrive, and become two regiments in 2017, with plans to have an active tank field range by then.

The photo below is just north of Yelnya. It is a snapshot from Yandex.ru, which I checked, but the actual image I borrowed from an Infonapalm post.

3.) 28th Motor Rifle Brigade in Klintsy (Bryansk Oblast), this unit is in the process of moving from Ekateriburg (Central MD) to the town of Klintsy, with lead elements arriving May 30, 2016.  A widely shared government tender, issued June 28th of this year, has shown the planned structure of the base, for what looks like a newly formed unit designated to be the 488th Motor Rifle Regiment.  This may well be the base of the division since typical Russian units are organized as brigade/battalion.  Perhaps the division itself will be headquartered further north in Yelnya, but with regiments as far south as Klintsy.  The work is slated for completion in Summer of 2017, so more than likely this unit will be stood up piecemeal over the coming year.

Which army gets what division? TASS news agency claimed that the Yelnya division will be assigned to the 1st Tank Army, but other sources suggested the unit in Klintsy, which forms the first regiment of this division,  will belong to 20th CAA.  This makes more sense, and it would be logical for the 10th Armored Division to go to 1st Tank Army, except for the fact that in the 1990s it was part  of the 20th CAA.  Back then the 20th was based in Voronezh and if Shoigu decides to ‘set right what Serduykov once set wrong’ then all must be put back in its place.

4.) 23rd Motor Rifle Brigade in Valuyki (Belgorod oblast) – This unit is moving from Samara in the Central MD as well, to a base planned to be completed by November 2016.  A government tender issued indicates that the construction is slated for 3,500 soldiers (size fits).  The brigade is composed of the following battalions: one armored, three motor rifle, two self-propelled artillery, one rocket artillery, two air defense and a host of supporting units.

This is the Valuyki base under construction.

Below is a satellite shot of the facility being built.

5.) 150th Division near Novocherkassk (Rostov Oblast) –  This division was rumored to be based on the 33rd Independent Motor Rifle Brigade, but it is also said it will be formed anew without building off of an existing brigade.  This particular division will be named after the 150th Idritsk-Berlin Division, famous for raising the flag over the Reichstag in 1945.  The 33rd Bde belongs to the 49th Army in Southern MD, however the contract servicemen were moved from Maikop to Novocherkassk, so it resides in two locations at the same time.  According to the timetable, the housing for this division is being thrown up quickly using modular construction, but it too is not planned to be finished until sometime in 2017.  Whether or not the 33rd will be subsumed into this division is an outstanding question, my view is that inevitably Russia will have to consume that brigade if they are to come up with 10,000 soldiers to staff a six regiment division.

The thing is some news reports also suggested Millerovo as one of the locations for a part of this division, Novocherkassk and Millerovo are not that close to each other.  It is still unknown how spread out this division will be in Rostov oblast. This photo was widely circulated in April 2016 of a deputy minister inspecting housing construction for the division.  No timeline for when it will be ready, but given the photo’s date its safe to assume they’ve not materialized the division out of thin air between April and August.

This could be another shot of a base being built for the division, complete with soccer fields.

6.) Millerovo Airbase (Rostov Oblast) – The airbase has been around for years. Close to the Ukrainian border, and well positioned to provide air support to the ground units in the region. In December 2014 Millerovo saw the restoration of the 31st Fighter Regiment with Mig-29 variants.  Following October 2015 the unit is being upgraded to much more capable Su-30SM, a heavy multirole fighter.  The 31st has received 20 new Su-30SMs, which is no small feat given they’re in high demand across the air force and aerospace forces.  Today the base likely houses ~60 fighters, including 20 Su-30Sm, 32 Mig-29, and a mix of Su-27 variants.

During various times the base has hosted a fair bit of ground equipment.  There is a motorized battalion assigned to it but at times satellite footage shows it hosting a decent ground contingent.  I’ve also noticed what looks like a 3D low bandwidth surveillance radar planted there on google earth, a Nebo 55G6 (Tall Rack).  No doubt has a good look over Ukrainian skies, and decent visibility on ‘low visibility’ aircraft.

Millerovo March 2014 – fairly clear.

Millerovo August 2015 with a larger footprint being taken up by ground units.

Millerovo runway shot from March 2016 (Janes paid for AirBus sat footage)

7.) Rostov region bases – The region is packed with military bases, but a few in particular are quite vast, including staging bases for units arriving to the region and going on rotation.  Some call this Rostov One.  I’m unsure of where the title came from.

Large base/staging area between Golovinka and Vodino – this is about one third of it in the shot from google on October 2014.  The base is so large that it would take three images to do it justice.  This area was setup promptly during the start of conflict with Ukraine for self explainable reasons.  Nothing was here in late 2013 except green fields according to google earth.

Up close you will find a variety of units camped out there.  In this shot we have towed artillery, but there’s plenty of MLRS, and various armored vehicle types as well.

Persianovsky, northeast of Novocherkassk is one of many bases in the Rostov region, which hosts training fields, and numerous military equipment storage areas.  This facility has been mentioned in recent articles, erroneously, because a look on google earth shows its been here for years and has not substantially expanded.  I don’t quite understand why it is making headlines.

Conclusion: There has been a large force shift in the southwestern direction for Russia, and incidentally, nothing comparable to speak of in the Baltic region or Kaliningrad. Today most of these plans are progressing, although some announcements are only now being realized with construction tenders.  Most of the units are at least a year out from being stood up or completing their transfer to the region.  By the second half of 2017 many of the units should be in place, though likely not at full strength.  Russian leaders speak of these divisions frequently in the press, framing them as a  response to “NATO’s build up”, but its quite clear these plans long in motion before any of NATO’s recent initiatives and their purpose has little to nothing to do with the Alliance.

This is a network of garrisons designed to deter Ukraine from believing it could win a limited conventional war some years down the line.  The concept is centered around creating strike groups under the organizational framework of divisions.  Each formation is designed to handle an assault in their sector, taking in other units as necessary and supporting them in the fight.  With two CAAs, Russia intends to ring Ukraine sufficiently so as not to be concerned with the question of what a mid-long term high end fight might look like should a different leader arrive in Kiev and choose to retake the separatist regions by force.  The revival of these forces in Western and Southern MD is a permanent insurance policy for Moscow.

Special thanks to the other blogs that compile news and information, in particular for this blog: BMPD and Russian Defense Policy.  Some Ukrainian sources were helpful as well.

THE EXPENSIVE PRETZEL LOGIC OF DETERRING RUSSIA BY DENIAL

This article was published on War on the Rocks (June 23, 2016)

The question of how to best deter Russia looms large over the upcoming NATO Summit hosted in Warsaw.  If this week’s news is anything to go by, the annual NATO gathering promises to be an eventful one.  Germany’s Foreign Minister Steinmeier recently ridiculed the alliance’s BALTOPS exercise as “saber rattling,” while U.S. Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus defended the event.  The chief proposal for enhancing NATO deterrence on the table this year is the establishment of four multinational battalions to rotate through the Baltics, but NATO’s Secretary-General Jens Soltenberg said there was no “immediate threat against any NATO country from the East,” implying that despite being branded as a deterrent this is more about reassurance.  The past two weeks in the run up to the summit makes one wonder, what exactly are we doing here?

In my critical essay last month, I challenged the current thinking on NATO’s deterrence problems in the East, taking on prominent advocates for deploying U.S. forces in the Baltic in the quest of strengthening deterrence.  Part of that article took aim at RAND’s wargame and similar arguments from deterrence proponents like Elbridge Colby.  The goal of that article was to take one-sided policy advocacy, rarely the stuff of good decision-making, and turn it into a more substantive discussion.  In this essay, I circle back to the problem of fixing NATO deterrence and the policy implications, with a crystallized and hopefully better distilled approach to the argument.

When discussing NATO force structure, it is crucial to decide whether one can truly attain deterrence by denial. I argue that this is a fool’s errand.  The fear of a Russian fait accompli in the Baltic is simply the latest conventional wisdom, following on the foot heels of equally wrongheaded concerns that Russia would create a land bridge to Crimea in 2014 and 2015. In my view, improving deterrence by punishment is not just the smarter approach, but also the only feasible option NATO has available.

So where do we go from here?  At first glance these perspectives are diametrically opposed.  However, a closer reading of deterrence proponents’ arguments reveals to me that we are largely in agreement on the basics.  Proponents of bolstering, enhancing, or increasing the robustness of NATO’s deterrence in the Baltics are fixated on conventional deterrence by denial.  Their intent is in the right place, but their ideas for how to solve this problem are not.  In the process of defending their views, they concede all my principal points on the nature of the fight and its problems.  The difference is then in the analysis and consequently the policy recommendations.

The rest can be found at http://warontherocks.com/2016/06/the-expensive-pretzel-logic-of-deterring-russia-by-denial/

Russia’s New Divisions in the West

On January 12th Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu announced the formation of three new divisions.  These are not a response to U.S. force deployments in Europe, NATO’s exercises, or the prospect of new multinational battalions in the Baltic states.  The thinking in Russia’s General Staff appears to be about a Ukrainian and Belorussian contingency, namely a second and more intense war with Ukraine or perhaps a color revolution in Belarus.  The map of where these new units will be formed is quite telling: Yelnya, Bogychar and Novocherkassk.  While NATO is busy discussing deterrence, reassurance, resolve, Russia has Ukraine on it’s mind and is implementing long discussed plans to permanently base units on Ukraine’s borders.

From Vedomosti:

What we know about the new divisions is that they be formed on the basis of existing brigades, likely not composed of new units but generated from forces already deployed in the Western Military District.  The divisions are promised to number 10,000 strong and were announced piecemeal between 2014-2016, formations to be based largely on garrisoned or newly formed independent brigades already in those regions.

1.) Bogychar, Voronezh Oblast.  This division will likely be formed on the basis of the 1st Independent Armored Brigade (not to be confused with 1st Tank Army), which will assume the legacy of the 10th Armor Division a unit that during the reforms was converted in 2009 into the 262nd military base.  The 9th independent motor rifle brigade may contribute units to this division because in February 2015 it shifted elements to Bogychar from Dzerzhinsk.  The plans for this division were first revealed in July 2015.  In September 2015 plans were also announced to build a military garrison in Belogorod for a yet undisclosed unit to be housed there, close to Ukraine’s northern border.

2.) Yelnya, Smolensk Oblast.  The plans for this division were announced back in November 2014.  In September 2015 it was said that a newly formed motor rifle brigade will return to Yelnya, where there once used to be the 144th motor rifle division withdrawn from Germany.  That unit was disbanded in 1998 and converted into a military warehouse base.  It’s possible the new unit will assume the legacy of the 144th and become the core of the announced division. Early July of 2015 the MoD announced that this motor rifle division will be formed by June of 2017 (optimistically) and be assigned to the 1st Tank Guards Army.  It’s structure will be a classic 6 regiment build, 3 motor rifle, 1 armor, 1 artillery, 1 air defense and the rest support units.

3.) Novocherkassk, Rostov Oblast.  This division is likely to be based on the 33rd Independent Motor Rifle Brigade shifted from Maikop to Rostov.  This particular division will be named after the 150th Idritsk-Berlin Division, famous for raising the flag over the Reichstag in 1945.

4th Kantemirovskaya Division training

The Return

The steady change in force posture 2013-2016 is an important overall development among Russian ground forces.  During the 2008-2012 Serdyukov military reforms, Russia reduced the number of armor and motor rifle battalions from 50 to 22 around Moscow in the Western Military District.  Most forces from Ukraine’s borders were almost completely withdrawn during the reforms, such as the 10th Armor Division that may be restored in part in Bogychar, Voronezh.

Since 2013 Russia has seen the partial return of disbanded or relocated units to the Western Military District largely based South West of Moscow near Belarus and Ukraine.  Additional brigades were created for the 20th Army, then the 1st Tank Army was formed, and following the war in Ukraine some units were brought north from the Southern Military District.  According to Sergei Shoigu’s announcement this year 30 military units have been brought back to the region, though their basing seems largely distant from NATO’s borders.  The recent history of the Western Military District can likely be divided into two periods 2009-2013, a time of demobilization and relocation of units away from Russia’s Western borders, and 2013-2016 the return of heavy ground forces in part driven by the conflict with Ukraine.

The most logical reason for bringing these units back is the Russian experience of having to put together Battalion Tactical Groups in early 2014 when deploying on Ukraine’s borders.  This was an improvised effort, combining the staff’s of 20th and 58th armies to plan out the deployments, which put together several powerful strike groups on Ukraine’s borders.  Despite their success, the process exposed two obvious problems for Russia’s Western MD.  First, Russia lacked permanently based units near Ukraine’s and Belarus’ borders, fully equipped with supporting elements allowing them to sustain a deployment.  The second was the absence of a larger formation that could take in battalions from other military districts and command them in the field, i.e. no divisional structure.  This made rotating units from Central MD and Eastern MD in the fight harder from a command perspective.  With three new divisions, Russia can now send battalion sized units to those commands, have them sort out logistics and support, or in a larger war serve as the center piece in a task organized strike group.

There and back again: divisions to brigades to divisions

What does this mean for the Russian army as a whole?  The return of divisions could be seen in line with the general walking back of Serdyukov’s reorganization, given the return of air regiments and divisions in the Air Force, back from air bases.  Similarly Shoigu restored the 4th Kantemirovskaya Armor Division and the 2nd Tamanskaya Motor Rifle Division, although both are honorary division names brought back for their historical legacy.  In reality these are half divisions in the Western Military District formed around two regiments each, composing the 1st Tank Army (announced though yet to be created).  However, thinking that divisions are back in the Russian military and brigades are out is an incorrect assessment.

Russia is not sticking wholly with brigades or switching back to divisions, instead looking at a mixed force structure.  In some ways this may be reminiscent of the U.S. Marine Corps which has brigades and battalions, divisions and regiments all within one service.  A very ‘hybrid’ organization in the parlance of modern military discourse, i.e. an eclectic mix of formations and groupings.

One of the unanswered questions is whether these divisions will truly be based more on a Soviet division structure, composed of four combined arms regiments and a much larger combination of supporting units.  If so, it will take quite a bit of equipment and existing units to form them.  Alternatively, they are likely to look like the 4th and 2nd division, formed around two regiments and a host of supporting units.  These would be in effect expanded brigades, with division level command staff and larger supporting units (artillery, air-defense, etc.)

Thanks to a number of sources: BMPD, Vedomosti, Gazeta RU, Topwar.ru, EagleRost, Defence.ru and others.